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of classical Greece are compared to 
the Aristophanic comic hero; both are 
examples of the struggles of the 
common man. Despite its wide-
ranging scholarship, D. still manages 
to make advanced aspects of Greek 
philosophy accessible. The technical 
discussion is rendered more lively 
(but also more lucid) by well chosen 
selections from the satirist Lucian. 
The final chapter effectively explains 
the place occupied by the Cynics in 
western intellectual history; in both 
literature and philosophy. An 
extensive guide to further reading 
(divided thematically in accordance 
with the chapter divisions) which 
accompanies the bibliography and a 
glossary of Greek terms, as well as a 
glossary of names, make Cynics ideal 
as an entry-level text to this particular 
branch of Greek philosophy. 
 
University College Cork             Carl O’Brien 
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William Desmond‘s God and the 
Between (GB) is a most welcome arrival 
not only because it completes the 
trilogy that this author had planned 
and announced in the mid 1990s — 
Being and the Between (BB, 1995) and 
Ethics and the Between (EB, 2001) being 
the other two of the trilogy — but 
because it also pulls together, in a 
single study, pivotal points of thinking 
which this author has sounded in 
many of his hitherto notable and 
prodigious publications in 
philosophy. Though some 
acquaintance with Desmond‘s 
deftness to the ‗plurivocity‘ of the 
meaning of being and the ‗the flexible 
structure‘ of the ‗fourfold 
understandings‘ of being (as univocal, 
equivocal, dialectical and 
metaxological) already articulated in 
BB would be helpful in understanding 
the issues addressed in this book, this 
third book of the trilogy, nonetheless, 
stands on its own. Indeed, one gets 
the impression from the author that 
GB is the book that he had always 
wanted to write, ‗from the days of my 
doctoral studies‘ (Preface, p. xi) in the 
early 1970s, but postponed doing so, 
as he instead ploughed his furrows of 
thoughts in his previous nine books 
and many, many articles in 
philosophy. 
GB is a highly systematic 
study in metaphysics, but, remarkably, 
it does not produce a system of 
metaphysics nor argue from a pre-
determined system of metaphysics 
nor unfold as a pre-figured possibility 
of a system of metaphysics (see, Ch. 6 
‗God and the Metaxological Way‘). It 
is, rather, a carefully thought-through 
book in metaphysics, focusing 
primarily on the way both God and 
‗the between‘, by which he means the 
reality of life, death, being and non-
being we experience all around us, is 
understood or misunderstood. Thus 
in GB Desmond engages in 
metaphysical reflection on reality in 
conjunction with accurate historical 
allusions to the philosophical 
arguments of major thinkers in 
Western metaphysics from Plato to 
Heidegger (a point that cannot be said 
of Heidegger‘s account of the history 
of metaphysics). It is divided into four 
main parts: Part I Godlessness, Part II 
Ways to God, Part III Gods, Part IV 
God, comprising fourteen chapters. 
The titles and organization of the 
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chapters indicate both the trajectory 
and the systematic nature of this 
study, hence, they are worth listing in 
order of presentation: (Part I) 1 
‗Godlessness and the Ethos of Being‘; 
2 ‗Beyond Godlessness‘ (Part II) 3 
‗God and the Univocal Way‘; 4 ‗God 
and the Equivocal Way‘; 5 ‗God and 
the Dialectical Way‘; 6 ‗God and the 
Metaxological Way‘; 7 ‗God Beyond 
the Between‘; (Part III) 8 ‗God(s) 
Many and One: On Polytheism and 
Monotheism‘; 9 ‗God(s) Personal and 
Transpersonal: On the Masks of the 
Divine‘; 10 ‗God(s): On Passing 
through the Counterfeit Doubles of 
the Divine‘; 11 ‗God(s) of the Whole: 
On Pantheism and Panentheism‘; 12 
‗God Beyond the Whole: On the 
Theistic God of Creation‘; 13 ‗God(s) 
Mystic: On the Idiocy of God‘; (Part 
IV God) ‗Ten Metaphysical Cantos‘. 
The ten metaphysical cantos refer to 
‗a group of fundamental notions, 
sometimes called attributes, such as 
being, unity, eternity, immutability, 
impassibility, absoluteness, 
omnipotence, omniscience, infinity, 
goodness‘ which, since Kant, have 
received scant attention, ‗with a few 
exceptions (such as some recent 
analytic approaches)‘ (p. 282). 
Desmond revisits these ‗attributes‘, 
setting to work his metaxological 
metaphysics on these ten notions, 
‗mindful of difficulties pressed from a 
critical angle, mindful that the relative 
silence reflects the ethos of post-
Kantian thought, but mindful also 
that a metaxological philosophy offers 
the resources of a different 
understanding of the ethos of being‘ 
(p. 282).  And that different 
understanding of ‗the ethos [read, value] 
of being‘ that is advanced by 
Desmond in GB is marked definitively 
by this author‘s philosophical 
meditations on the significance and 
meaning of the good of creatio ex 
nihilo. 
That creation is a good, from 
a metaphysical point of view, is of 
crucial importance to Desmond. To 
view reality otherwise misconstrues 
reality as valueless being. And if value 
cannot be found in the good of reality 
given to our experiences, a Summum 
Bonum will certainly not be found. In 
such instances both being and God 
become devalued and idols and 
‗counterfeit doubles‘ set in place. For 
this author, then, no less than 
‗everything is at stake: the goodness 
or the pointlessness of the whole; 
God or nothing at all‘ (p. 328).  Far 
from avoiding the various nihilisms 
that have arisen in the aftermath of 
the demise of Hegelian metaphysics 
and the rise of Nietzschean death of 
God metaphysics, the author goes 
through these nihilisms by returning 
to the original value of ‗the to be‘ and 
‗the not to be‘ with the intention of 
hollowing out ‗a purer space‘ to ‗seek 
anew‘ the divine (p. 30). GB unfurls, 
therefore, as a philosophical 
meditation that goes through and 
beyond nihilisms focusing on ‗God‘ 
and ‗the Between‘, where ‗the 
Between‘ is where we find ourselves, 
in a created reality that lies between 
nothing and its Creator. 
GB, therefore, offers an 
alternative approach to the three 
transcendencies which the author 
identifies that have dominated and 
captured the minds (and the hearts 
and the brains) of many post-Kantian, 
post-Hegelian and post-Nietzschean 
philosophers, namely: the 
transcendence of the otherness of 
nature (T1); the transcendence 
characteristic of human existence or 
human self-surpassing (T2), 
understood as one‘s own freedom to 
be (‗conatus essendi’), however 
suspicious of such self-determination 
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the ‗three masters of suspicion‘ of the 
twentieth century, Freud, Marx, and 
Nietzsche, would have us; and the 
‗third transcendence‘ (T3), which is 
one that bespeaks neither of the 
exteriority of beings to one‘s own 
being nor of the interiority of one‘s 
own being to other beings, but of the 
superior ‗other‘ of God, an ‗agapeic 
God‘, capturing ‗a hyperbolic sense‘ of 
transcendence that is ‗Transcendence 
itself‘ (p.22). This latter transcendence 
(T3) cannot be an object of 
transcendence that is either univocally 
or equivocally determined in relation 
to T1 or T2 precisely because it is the 
(pre-)condition of those 
transcendencies. These three 
transcendencies, nevertheless, are 
distinct but related for Desmond, and 
so, they must be thought both in 
distinction and in relation to each 
other. To tackle them differently or to 
truncate any one of them would be to 
contort and disfigure ‗Transcendence 
itself‘ (pp. 41–3). Thus human 
openness to the divine as the 
unmeasured measure of all 
transcendencies, just as Augustine had 
intimated (see, p. 245, n. 6, p. 312, 
and esp., p. 157), is the key both to 
Desmond‘s thought and to his 
understanding of the mis-
understandings and mis-identifications 
of the relation between the human 
being, creation, and God that infect 
the discourse of so much religious 
and anti-religious thinking today. But 
how exactly can ‗a purer space‘ for the 
divine be retrieved, if our natural 
‗porosity‘ to the divine has been 
culturally, existentially, experientially 
and philosophically ‗clogged‘ (p. 35, 
340)? 
The way the author does this 
is through identifying a particular 
experience that evokes both a 
thinking of God and of the between 
(with which readers of his BB will be 
familiar), namely, the giftedness of the 
tenuousness of be-ing a being in 
being ‗at all‘ that is characteristic of 
any finite act of existence, and not 
just of one‘s own be-ing in being that 
Heidegger isolates and thus mutilates 
out of the between in ‘Dasein‘. (Thus I 
cannot agree with those 
commentators who maintain that 
Heidegger is ‗a consummate thinker 
of the middle‘, and I doubt Desmond 
does too). Desmond‘s scope and 
frame of reference is much wider than 
Heidegger‘s because ‗(T)he ―that it is‖ 
is known perhaps most intimately in 
the idiocy of our own being, though 
sometimes even more so in relation to 
the given being of the beloved other. 
But we can know it also in relation to 
the being of nature‘ (p. 129, my 
emphasis). Thus ‗astonished 
perplexity‘ (p. 128) extends not only 
to one‘s self and to nature but also 
and ‗even more so‘ to the given being 
of the beloved other precisely because 
this indicates — for those who have 
eyes to see it — a particular kind of 
giving (of the gift of another‘s love) 
that is not mine to give, but shareable. 
The metaphysical significance of this 
experience of one‘s fellow human 
being (qua beloved), for Desmond, is 
that it points to augmentation in 
being, agapeic origin and ‗agapeic 
community‘. At an archaeological 
level, creation out of nothing, 
understood as creating out of love 
from nothing, is the only model, if 
there is to be any model at all, for 
thinking the relation of Creator and 
created, God and the between (p. 161; 
232).  Any other model of origination 
will less than suffice, and possibly be 
dis-enabling, e.g., regarding the 
analogy of machine and maker in any 
understanding of being (ontology) or 
of Deism — where there is no 
inherent community of spirit — the 
result is ‗the between will be lost, as 
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will also its agapeic origin‘ (p. 227). 
This does not mean that all analogies 
are to be rejected for analogies 
breakthrough univocal, equivocal and 
dialectical manners of thinking. 
Proper analogies are needed. Thus 
‗the analogical conception is 
obviously [to Desmond] relevant, for 
this clearly wants to keep open the 
space of transcendence, even while 
not blocking some relativity to the 
immanence of creation. [...]. It calls 
attention to the participation of finite 
beings in being, a participation first 
made possible as a gift of the origin, a 
participation pointing to both the 
intimacy of the origin and also to an 
asymmetry, since the gift is exceeded by 
the giver.‘ (p. 283) Analogy pushes 
Desmond‘s thinking, consistently, 
through the dialectical to the 
metaxological. There is, then, a very 
important role that ‗analogy‘ plays in 
GB that was muted in BB. This is why 
GB, to this reader, stands on its own. 
Despite their differences, 
Hegel and Nietzsche, and their 
followers (such as atheistic Heidegger 
or theistic Heideggerians), have this 
much in common: they prevent 
questioning the meaning of being in 
relation to the question of the 
meaning of God; or, at least, so the 
author argues, correctly in my 
opinion. When either being or God is 
understood from an univocal point of 
view, both the inability to question the 
very fact of the thereness of being and 
the insignificance of either the 
existence or non-existence of God 
and the relevance of such to the study 
of that-which-is (metaphysics) is not 
far off (and in their stead reflections 
on counterfeit doubles of both being 
and God emerge). When either being 
or God is understood from an 
equivocal point of view, the 
otherness(es) of both in the 
ontological equation are missed. And 
when that otherness is thought 
together from a dialectical point of 
view, neither one nor the other is self-
sufficient to account for the fecundity 
of that unity of opposites or the pairs 
of that unity. Thus it is only by going 
through the univocal, equivocal and 
dialectical understandings of God and 
being that one is lead to, or catapulted 
into, passively (passio essendi), the 
agapeic origin of being in God‘s 
transcendence, securing in turn access 
to the being of the between and 
beyond the being of the between to 
‗the richest expression of ―being at 
one‖ as agapeic community [of the 
finite and the infinite]‘ (p. 289). 
GB is a remarkable 
hermeneutic retrieval of the 
metaphysical significances of the 
experiences of God and the between 
where the latter is not just 
experienced but thought as a created 
reality that lies between nothing and 
its Creator. Mention of ‗nothing‘ and 
of Desmond‘s treatment of ‗nothing‘ 
in GB, therefore, deserves special 
attention, in conclusion. 
Aristotle is famous for his 
saying that ‗being can be spoken of in 
several ways‘. Non-being too, 
however, can be spoken of in several 
ways: as privation (blindness), as 
potency (which is a kind of non-
being), as actual non-being (future 
generations), and as ideal non-being 
(square circles). But there is also the 
‗not to be‘ that is constitutive of each 
and any actual finite act of existing 
that Desmond also distinguishes, 
‗constitutive nothingness‘ (p. 251), 
following Aquinas, and not Aristotle 
(p. 243 and p. 133, n.11). And there is 
absolute non-being which is not the 
no-thingness of God but that which 
out of which everything is created — 
a surd for Parmenides as for him ex 
nihilo, nihil fit, and for all of his 
followers, up to and including Hegel 
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(p. 234), and Nietzsche (ibid.), and 
their followers; but it is a surd 
requiring thought. This ‗absolute 
nothing‘ is not reducible to the 
equally unwilled ‗nothingness‘ 
experienced in the mood of Angst that 
Heidegger (following Kierkegaard) 
singles out. Nor is this ‗absolute 
nothing‘ properly understood as God 
creating ‗from God‘s own 
nothingness,‘ as Gregory of Nyssa 
would have it, because this, as 
Desmond acutely notes, is still ‗a kind 
of ―emanation‖‘ (p. 245, n. 6). Rather, 
in line with Augustine (Confessions, 13, 
33), creation ex nihilo, for Desmond, 
‗is ―a te, non de te facta sunt‖‘ (ibid., 
‗things are made by you, not made of 
you‘). 
And then, most tellingly, 
‗there is an ―It is nothing‖ of 
forgiveness [...] [which] is the 
willingness to set the evil ―at naught‖‘ 
(p. 287). Such acts do not annul or 
cancel the evils done, as the latter are 
recognised and acknowledged for 
what they are. Nor do such acts of 
forgiveness wish away such evils, as 
their historicity cannot be removed. 
But acts of forgiving do something 
more than the ‗nothing‘ that is 
produced by evil (natural or moral) 
precisely because ‗the forgiving ―yes‖ 
[...] offers release again, beyond the 
―no‖ that blights being‘ (p. 335). In 
this regard to set the evil at naught is 
‗to offer again the promise of life, and 
so to restore primal faith and hope in 
being‘ (p. 287). Thus in forgiving one 
imitates the creative process in the 
sense that creation is an act that 
unfolds out of and in deference to the 
goodness of being, the goodness of 
the other‘s being, the goodness at 
being and in being. Forgiveness, then, 
can only be fathomed from an 
agapeic origin that remains at once 
both in touch with and outside of the 
good of its receiver. This is why 
‗being given to be at all as an ethical 
being‘ (p. 314, my emphasis) pushes us 
to think of God as higher than that, 
and thus as never reducible to T1 
(nature transcendence) or to T2 
(human transcendence). God is ‗an 
overdeterminate goodness‘. On this 
evidence, ‗the hyperbolic good 
suggests more than justice on the 
measure of human retribution‘ (p. 
334). There is in existence an 
exigency, however enigmatic, ‗calling 
us to a good in excess of the measure 
of our moralities, freeing in us of a 
forgiving agape, of mercy beyond 
justice, of service for the other 
beyond autonomy‘ (p. 333). We could 
put it this way: What Levinas does in 
his thinking for Judaism in his 
retrieval of the significances of the 
meaning of the experiences of the 
other as othered in society (the poor, 
the widow, the orphan, the leper) that 
are documented in the Hebrew Bible 
(Tanakh) for the re-cognition of the 
approaching otherness of God, 
Desmond does in his thinking for 
Christianity in his retrieval of the 
significances of the meaning of the 
experiences of the very giftedness of 
the good of being that are also 
documented in the Old and New 
Testaments for the re-cognition of 
the approaching otherness of Agapeic 
Love. Thinking the giftedness of 
finite acts of being, then, invites 
more, and not less thinking about 
one‘s fellow human being, one‘s self, 
nature (created reality), God and the 
between. The embargo on thought 
and metaphysics has been lifted. For 
that, one cannot but be grateful to the 
originality of this author‘s work. 
 
NUI Maynooth                            Cyril McDonnell 
 
